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by Richard W. Fisher
The roots of the current crisis are not unlike those of earlier bubbles. 
They originated in the seductive power of price escalation—of a “whole lot of 
excess”—and the “egocentricity of the present,” which led some to believe we 
had entered a “new era.” We either didn’t notice this elaborate conceit or failed 
to deal with it. 
  But it was there. Many coastal areas of the U.S. were beginning to see 
20 to 30 percent year-over-year increases in house prices, some even as high as 
30 to 40 percent. Subprime mortgage borrowing, or lending to less creditworthy 
individuals by lenders who were eager to finance a “sure thing,” exploded.
  The good news is that levels of homeownership among the U.S. popu-
lation reached unprecedented heights, extending the American dream to more
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Editor’s note: When it 
comes to the U.S. financial 
markets, Richard Fisher has, 
so to speak, been in the belly 
of the beast. Before becoming 
Dallas Fed president in 2005, 
his career included success 
in the private sector—first 
in private banking at Brown 
Brothers Harriman & Co., 
then running his own   
investment firms and   
serving on corporate boards.
 
Fisher’s experience as   
market operator and Fed 
official gives him a broad 
perspective on the financial 
stresses and strains from the 
excesses in mortgage lending. 
We hope the following   
excerpts from his speeches   
will help our readers better 
understand recent events and   
the Fed’s response to them.
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pants were gagging on the many types 
of structured credit products—not just 
those backed by mortgages—they 
were being served. 
As we approached the summer 
of 2007, this gag reflex reached a pin-
nacle; the larger banks found it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to sell to others 
many types of loans; and the interbank 
lending market experienced intense 
liquidity pressures as banks became 
fearful of lending to each other for 
longer than overnight. 
We’ve seen yet another histori-
cal cycle of excess risk-taking—in this 
case, concentrated in financial innova-
tions in credit and structured finance 
served up and consumed without 
regard for the downside—followed by 
extreme risk aversion. 
This round of speculation and 
financial amnesia seems to have been 
driven by a combination of factors, 
including an over-reliance on statistical 
models and rating agencies, exces-
sive liquidity and perverse incen-
tives compounded by an excess of 
complacency.
On spreading troubles. Things 
began to unravel once it became 
apparent that the housing bubble could 
not expand forever. Losses began to 
be recorded on traditional mortgage-
backed securities, with the newer types 
of structured finance products used to 
securitize the newer types of mortgage 
lending being especially hard hit. 
It didn’t stop there. Banks in 
other countries that had invested in 
the too-good-to-be-true U.S. housing 
market through these products began 
to record large losses. Even some that 
weren’t directly involved in the U.S. 
housing sector or these products still 
felt the repercussions; who could have 
imagined that house price declines in 
the U.S. would contribute to a bank 
run in England? 
All types of structured credit 
products soon came under suspicion. 
Issuance of asset-backed commercial 
paper declined sharply beginning last 
summer. Although some of that paper 
people than before. The bad news is 
that the methods used to do so were 
not sustainable.
On financial markets. We saw 
a wave of innovative mortgage prod-
ucts during the housing boom. Indeed, 
there would have been no other way 
for many borrowers to have procured 
financing without these new mortgage 
products. 
These innovations in financing 
took two forms. First, credit-scoring 
models enabled lenders to better 
sort and price mortgages made to 
nonprime borrowers. The second set 
of innovations allowed these loans to 
be funded and sold to a new class of 
investors. 
While traditional mortgages had 
long been securitized and sold through 
government-sponsored enterprises 
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
the securitization market ushered in 
new players from the private sector 
who would hold nonprime mortgages 
that could not meet the standards of 
Fannie and Freddie and that banks 
would generally not hold in portfolios. 
These so-called structured credit 
products became all the rage with 
investors. These new and complex 
securities sliced and diced risk into 
different tranches. It was thought that 
the collateralized debt obligations and 
collateralized loan obligations could 
be hedged with credit default swaps to 
make them seem almost risk free. 
On the flash point. Like exotic 
foods, consumption of new risk prod-
ucts can lead to indigestion, and even 
allergic reactions. Lately, we have 
witnessed many allergic reactions—in 
the form of losses and setbacks—
especially among money center banks 
and other financial institutions.  
What began as isolated pockets 
of trouble in the U.S. housing market 
soon spread to global markets in mort-
gage-backed securities, where many 
of the exotic home mortgage products 
were gobbled up. Soon it became 
obvious that financial market partici-
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was backed by mortgages, not all of 
it was. But that didn’t seem to matter. 
The market for auction rate munici-
pal bonds was also hit, as doubts 
spread regarding the financial health 
of the misnamed “monoline” insurers. 
Investment banks also experienced 
abnormal difficulties in the usually rou-
tine task of syndicating their leveraged 
loans in the private equity sphere, 
which is fairly remote from the mort-
gage industry. 
The banking industry was smack 
in the middle of this maelstrom. This 
sector is of obvious importance to the 
Federal Reserve. Not surprisingly, large 
losses have been recorded at some of 
the largest banks. Their capital ratios 
are also under pressure from the fall-
out in the securitization markets. 
The difficulty in selling loans and 
the increase in lending to borrowers 
who were shut out of the securitiza-
tion markets have increased banks’ 
exposure. In addition, some banks that 
offered off-balance-sheet commitments 
to their structured investment vehicles, 
or SIVs, have found themselves having 
to move these assets onto their bal-
ance sheets. 
All this asset on-boarding has 
pressured capital ratios. Combine 
these pressures with the difficulty of 
establishing values for structured credit 
products in seized-up markets and it is 
no surprise that term interbank lending 
thinned out considerably.
On monitoring lapses. Seasoned 
investors and creditors know that 
incomplete information—or informa-
tion asymmetry, in technical jargon—
is a fact of life in financial markets. 
In fact, the presence of information 
asymmetries goes a long way toward 
explaining the structure of financial 
markets and institutions. In our sys-
tem, we have implemented a process 
of “delegated monitoring” to address 
these asymmetries.
Let me explain what I mean 
by “delegated monitoring.” Because 
an individual saver would be hard-
pressed to monitor the many potential 
Conducting Monetary Policy
  As we sat down to the FOMC table, we were faced with a situation that, 
drawing on my Naval Academy days, I would liken to a ship navigating a 
narrow passage between two shorelines. 
  On one shore, we have an otherwise healthy economy weakened to 
an unknown degree by a correction to excessive speculation in its housing 
sector and related financial instruments. On the price front, the economy 
has been experiencing mitigation in inflationary tendencies, thanks, I believe, 
to prudent monetary policy—albeit against a background of an energetic 
global  economy  that  continues  to  create  upward  price  pressures  on  all 
sorts of commodities, on transportation costs and even on what was once 
assumed to be an endless supply of cheap imports from China.
  If we had maintained the anti-inflationary course we had been following 
for more than 14 months by holding the fed funds rate at 5.25 percent, I 
believe we would have risked oversteering our course and potentially run 
afoul of the shoals of unacceptably slow economic growth. 
  Those of you who know me are aware that I am a compulsive worrier 
about inflation—I do not know any central banker in the world worth his or 
her salt who is not—because I see inflation as the bête noire, or bugbear, 
of  any  successful  economy.  Recent  trends  in  inflationary  impulses  and 
expectations, however, appeared to me to provide some wiggle room to 
adjust our tiller and steer a more growth-oriented course.
  Looking  to  the  other  shoreline,  we  were  confronting  the  rocky 
outcropping  that  economists  call  moral  hazard.  From  these  rocks,  one 
could hear the siren call of market operators and institutions that had made 
imprudent decisions and now hoped the Fed would rescue them with easy 
money. Overcorrecting our course with too aggressive a shift in the fed 
funds tiller would have, I believe, undermined the discipline that market 
forces impose upon wayward financial institutions and investors. 
  Moral hazard is a dangerous predicament for any central bank. Yet we 
had an unsettled money market riddled with angst—a money market that, in 
my view, was going into a defensive crouch in which even the best and most 
careful depository institutions and market operators feared that the positions 
taken by their less prudent brethren may come up a cropper and seize up the 
entire financial system.
  Those  were  the  conditions  on  the  financial  seas  when  we  met 
September 18. As with any navigator of turbulent seas, the FOMC relies on 
an impressive array of instruments; we are blessed with a rich complement 
of superb economists and a fulsome dashboard of databases. But in the 
end, no models or formulas substitute for judgment in making monetary 
policy. The course of monetary policy is a matter of discernment—akin to 
the decisions made by a ship captain who knows that steering through a 
turbulent sea requires drawing on more than just charts and computerized 
navigation equipment. 
  Drawing upon its best judgment, the committee chose to navigate the 
passage with a 50-basis-point reduction in base rates, following its Aug. 17 
action to reduce the spread between the discount rate and the federal funds 
rate. 
  Central banking is not and never should be a popularity contest. It is 
a serious duty undertaken by earnest public servants for the greatest good 
of the nation. Thus, FOMC members will continue taking in-depth soundings 
on the progress of the economy and the financial markets as we evaluate the 
impact of the need for course corrections. Should further correction—either 
to port or to starboard—be needed to stay on the course toward sustainable, 
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borrowers to whom they could lend, 
they have delegated that monitoring 
role to their bank, which then is in 
charge of keeping tabs on borrow-
ers. In the U.S., where the safety of 
deposits at most banks is federally 
guaranteed, regulators are a delegated 
monitor, loosely speaking, watching 
over banks on behalf of their collec-
tive depositors. 
The regulators also are not above 
delegating some work. Rather than 
attempting to monitor the entire uni-
verse of financial institutions, U.S. 
regulators rely heavily on a core group 
of very large money center banks with 
significant exposures, expecting them 
to act as delegated monitors, disciplin-
ing the remaining players in the finan-
cial system through effective controls 
on counterparty risk by assessing and 
limiting the risk of other banks, hedge 
funds and private equity firms. And 
finally, regulators and investors alike 
have come to depend on ratings agen-
cies to assess and monitor firms and 
securities on their behalf. 
All these complex monitoring 
arrangements are motivated, at least 
in part, by the fact that information is 
costly. Yet it seems to me that a lot 
of our recent problems can be attrib-
uted to breakdowns in this chain of 
delegated monitoring. To this end, the 
secretary of the Treasury has put for-
ward recommendations to modernize 
and clarify the chain of command of 
delegated monitoring. We are studying 
the recommendations he has made—as 
is the Congress and others —and will 
contemplate them dispassionately over 
time.
On the Fed’s response. The 
Federal Reserve is doing its level best 
to facilitate the process of price dis-
covery and adjustment from a period 
of excess in a manner that restores 
the efficacy of the financial system. 
Even as we have been cutting 
the fed funds rate—even as we 
have been opening the monetary 
spigot—interest rates for private sec-
tor borrowers have not fallen cor-
Listening to Washington Irving
  There  is  nothing  “unprecedented”  about  the  situation  we  find 
ourselves  in.  To  illustrate  the  point,  I  want  to  read  a  passage  from 
Washington Irving’s 1819 essay on the Mississippi Bubble. For those 
of you who think the recent housing bubble and the ensuing financial 
imbroglio are “unprecedented,” listen to these words penned almost 200 
years ago:
    Every now and then the world is visited by one of these 
delusive  seasons,  when  the  ‘credit  system’…expands  to  full 
luxuriance: everybody trusts everybody; a bad debt is a thing 
unheard of; the broad way to certain and sudden wealth lies plain 
and open…. Banks…become so many mints to coin words into 
cash; and as the supply of words is inexhaustible, it may readily 
be supposed what a vast amount of promissory capital is soon in 
circulation…. Nothing is heard but gigantic operations in trade; 
great purchases and sales of real property, and immense sums 
made at every transfer. All, to be sure, as yet exists in promise; 
but the believer in promises calculates the aggregate as solid 
capital….
    Now is the time for speculative and dreaming or designing 
men. They relate their dreams and projects to the ignorant and 
credulous, [and] dazzle them with golden visions…. The example 
of  one  stimulates  another;  speculation  rises  on  speculation; 
bubble rises on bubble…. No ‘operation’ is thought worthy of 
attention, that does not double or treble the investment…. Could 
this delusion always last, the life of a merchant would indeed be 
a golden dream; but it is as short as it is brilliant.1
  And  to  think,  Washington  Irving  had  never  met  a  subprime 
mortgage, or a CDO, a CLO, an SIV or a credit default swap! It is 
indeed true that those who ignore history are condemned to repeat 
it.  That  is  the  bad  news.  Financiers,  “dazzle[ing]  the  credulous,” 
including regulators, repeated history in spades, despite their claim 
to  unprecedentedly  clever  and  new  risk-management  tools  and 
mathematical sophistication. It was as short as it was momentarily 
“brilliant.” 
  But that is done, and now we must do what we can to remedy the 
situation. One thing, however, is clear. The answer, to be curt, is not to 
compound the bad by repeating the oft-prescribed remedy of inflating 
our way out of our predicament with a wing-and-a-prayer promise that 
it can always be reined in later, as some public commentators have 
suggested. It is for this reason that I have maintained a strong reluctance 
to further general monetary accommodation and the FOMC as a group 
has stressed vigilence on inflation. At the same time, I have been an 
advocate of using our various discount window facilities, within reason, 
to bridge the financial system’s structural problems as the credit markets 
correct themselves and run the long course of contrition.
 
1 Washington Irving, “A Time of Unexampled Prosperity,” The Crayon Papers: The 
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respondingly, and rates for some 
borrowers have increased. To address 
this problem, we have created some 
new facilities that should provide a 
liquidity bridge over the currently 
dysfunctional system while the mar-
ketplace and regulators—ourselves 
included—go about restoring the sys-
tem’s plumbing.
The term auction facility—
known by its acronym, TAF—was 
introduced in December as an entire-
ly new approach to funding problems 
at banks. Those who are eligible for 
primary credit at the Fed’s traditional 
discount window can now bid at 
bimonthly auctions for term funds. 
So far, the auctions have been well-
subscribed and term funding pres-
sures abated after the introduction of 
the TAF.
The term securities lending 
facility we announced last month 
expands the Fed’s securities lending 
program. Securities will now be made 
available through an auction process 
with an expanded array of collateral 
on a weekly basis for a term of 28 
days. We also set up a primary dealer 
credit facility, an overnight lending 
facility that provides funding to pri-
mary dealers in exchange for a range 
of eligible collateral. 
And, at the request of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
the Board of Governors of the Fed 
approved a loan to J. P. Morgan so 
that that bank might digest the expo-
sure that many counterparties had 
to Bear Stearns, without rewarding 
Bear Stearns shareholders for the 
imprudent risks assumed by their 
management.
On the Fed’s goals. The objec-
tive of all this activity is to provide a 
bridge for the financial system while it 
transitions from a period of indiscrimi-
nate excess and gets back to normalcy. 
I do not believe the Fed should be, or 
is, “bailing out” any particular institu-
tion. Nor do I personally believe that 
any institution in and of itself is “too 
big to fail.” 
But I do believe that we must 
have a financial system that is in 
working order. We must have a sys-
tem where the chain of delegated 
monitors operates smoothly and 
efficiently. We must have a system 
where the financial pipes and sprin-
kler heads that nourish capitalism 
sustain the fertile lawn that is the 
American economy. It is the Fed’s 
duty as lender of last resort to lead 
the way to restoring the efficacy of 
the financial system.
The Fed has made some tough 
judgment calls lately, and, having 
been party to making those calls, I 
can assure you they certainly were not 
made lightly. In principle, we know 
that the market should decide the 
winners and losers, who survives and 
who fails. I am a big fan of Winston 
Churchill. “It is always more easy to 
discover and proclaim general prin-
ciples than to apply them,” Churchill 
said. I now know full well what he 
meant.
Looking to the future, the emerg-
ing discussion on new regulations and 
a new supervisory framework should 
proceed, but regulations by themselves 
cannot replace good judgment by indi-
vidual investors or bankers or finan-
ciers, and certainly by policymakers. 
Policymakers need to remain 
vigilant in seeking the right balance 
between prudent and indiscriminate 
risk taking. But the elimination of 
risk—and the consequences of incur-
ring risk—can never be the goal of 
any policymaker in a capitalist system. 
In building the bridge to restore finan-
cial order and efficiency, my primary 
interest is to do the minimum neces-
sary to get the job done. And no more. 
On the historical perspective. 
In assessing the situation, don’t let any-
one convince you that we’ve entered 
a “new era.” The details may be differ-
ent, but we’ve been here before. Allow 
me to temper the ego of the present 
by recalling the not-too-distant past 
and the events that happened right 
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In the 1980s, the euphoria of oil 
prices around $100 a barrel in today’s 
dollars led to a frenzy of lending 
activity in Texas. At least I think that’s 
what any reasonable observer would 
call the annual growth rate of busi-
ness loans of over 40 percent at Texas 
banks and annual growth in commer-
cial real estate lending of almost 50 
percent that we saw in the early part 
of that decade. 
Booking assets at such a rapid 
clip has a seductive power. My favor-
ite line from the musical “Evita” is 
when she belts out, “All I want is a 
whole lot of excess!” Well, we cer-
tainly pursued excess here in the 
1980s. In pursuit of a seemingly sure 
thing, more than 550 new banks were 
chartered in Texas from 1980 through 
1985. 
This made for a volatile brew, 
combining dramatic rates of growth 
in activity with a dramatic expansion 
of the number of players with limited 
experience in knowing what to do 
when things go wrong. The assump-
tion of permanently high, or perma-
nently rising, prices in an asset class—
in this case, oil—invariably leads to 
regrettable decisions. 
You recall what ensued. Real oil 
prices began to fall, contributing to an 
economic slowdown in the region’s 
most energy-sensitive areas, such as 
Houston. The regional economy held 
its own for a while, propelled by a 
red-hot commercial real estate sector. 
The state economy suffered a severe 
decline, however, when oil collapsed 
to the current equivalent of around 
$22 per barrel by mid-1986. Bank and 
thrift failures reached a frightful mag-
nitude. More than 800 financial institu-
tions went out of business in Texas 
during the 1980s and into the early 
1990s. Nine of the 10 largest banking 
organizations based in Texas didn’t 
make it.
On booms and busts. Ned 
Gramlich, a much-revered and very 
wise former Fed governor who, sadly, 
succumbed to leukemia in September, 
Dallas Fed Chief Rejects Japan Analogy
  Comparisons  between  the  U.S.  today  and  Japan  in  the  1990s  are 
misleading and could lead to the wrong conclusions for economic policy, 
Richard Fisher, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, has told 
the Financial Times.
  Mr. Fisher, an inflation hawk, said: “To say we are falling into the Japan 
trap, that we are like Japan was in the 1990s, is in my view very misleading. 
It would be a mistake for us to do now what we advised them to do back 
then.”
  The Dallas Fed president, who spent much of the 1990s in Japan as a 
hedge fund manager and later as co-chairman of the U.S.–Japan commission 
on deregulation, said the microeconomic foundations of the two economies 
were completely different. 
  “You are not even comparing apples with oranges,” he said. “These are 
totally different societies, different economies, different political systems.”
  His comments, in an interview, challenge the assertion that Japan in 
the 1990s offers a useful template as to what could happen to the U.S. as a 
result of the house price bust. 
  A number of experts—in particular in Japan—believe the parallels are 
close enough that the U.S. should implement the kind of policies it pressed 
Japan to deploy then, including the use of public funds to recapitalise the 
banking system.
  Yoshimi  Watanabe,  minister  for  financial  policy  and  administrative 
reform, told the FT recently that “given Japan’s lesson, public fund injection 
is unavoidable.”
  However, Mr. Fisher said that while there were superficial similarities 
between the two episodes—both of which involve sharp declines in asset 
prices—the “dramatic differences between our societies and our economies” 
meant different policy actions were required.
  Mr. Fisher said “our society and our economy are enormously flexible. 
Theirs were not.” He said the financial systems were “totally different”—
with Japan then dominated by banks and the state-owned postal savings 
system, and the U.S. today dominated by securitised financial markets.
  Moreover, Japan was practically a “command economy” with universal 
acceptance that the government should play a “highly intrusive” role in the 
private sector, Mr. Fisher said. 
  Because of the differences between the economies, he maintained, 
injection of public funds into U.S. banks was “less necessary than it was in 
the case of Japan.”
  The  Dallas  Fed  chief  said  the  U.S.  had  only  started  pushing  for 
recapitalisation  of  Japan’s  banking  system  after  Japan  had  remained  in 
stagnation for years after the original stock market and real estate crash—
and was at risk of deepening deflation.
  He said that this parallel was “not applicable” to the U.S. today. 
  He added: “We are adjusting much more quickly. We are going through 
the price discovery process. It is enormously painful but it is happening.”
—Krishna Guha
Reprinted with permission from 
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reminded us that America’s economic 
progress has been punctuated with 
booms and busts. The 19th century 
had its canal, railroad and mineral 
booms. The 20th century had its rush-
es of financial innovation and new 
technology.
Each boom was followed by a 
collapse when prices could no longer 
keep up. “When the dust clears,” 
Gramlich wrote, “there is financial 
carnage, many investors learning to 
be more careful next time, but there 
are often the fruits of the boom still 
around to benefit productivity…. The 
canals and railroads are still there and 
functional, the minerals are discovered 
and in use, the financing innovations 
stay and we still have the Internet and 
all its capabilities.” The fruits of the 
subprime market boom, he reminded 
us, are the millions of low-income and 
minority borrowers who now own 
their own homes and are successfully 
making their payments and building 
equity for the future. 
Keep this in mind as the housing 
market corrects and the new financial 
instruments spawned by the housing 
boom and turbocharged financial tech-
nology continue seeking more rational 
price levels—levels that will be deter-
mined not by ersatz valuation models 
and unsustainable return assumptions, 
but by the market’s discipline in equili-
brating supply and demand. A great 
many families who would never have 
had access to the ultimate fruit of the 
American harvest—homeownership—
were able to achieve that dream 
because of the housing boom. 
And what about the “bust” side 
of the equation, what Gramlich 
referred to as the “financial carnage”? 
I managed a hedge fund for 10 years 
before selling my interests in 1997, 
as I wound up a banking and asset-
management career that had started 
in 1975. I know from experience that 
markets are manic-depressive, sub-
ject to enormous mood swings. They 
overshoot not only on the upside in 
periods of enthusiasm but also on the 
downside when reality sets in.
On the nature of risk. We must 
not forget that prudent risk taking is 
the lifeblood of capitalism, especially 
in the American form of capitalism 
where we are constantly replacing the 
old with the new, and the familiar with 
the new and the innovative. If we had 
not taken risks, we would never have 
created from scratch the $14 trillion 
U.S. economy. 
The necessity of risk taking as a 
pillar of market capitalism has also giv-
en rise to agents to service it. Insurers 
and banks are two such agents, as 
are investment banks, money manag-
ers, hedge funds and other financial 
intermediaries that provide the means 
to assess, package and distribute risk. 
In the old days, their job was fairly 
straightforward. 
The agents packaged straight-up 
risk instruments like letters of credit, 
bankers’ acceptances, commercial 
paper, simple loans and stocks, life 
and property insurance and fixed-rate 
mortgages. 
More recently, with the aid of 
technology and computational power 
that can assess probabilities at light-
ning speeds, the menu of risk instru-
ments expanded dramatically. Financial 
intermediaries began offering exotic 
products to satisfy almost any risk 
taker’s needs anywhere in the world at 
any time. 
Hunger for the new risk products 
was stimulated by a lengthy period 
of abnormally low interest rates and 
the normal human instinct to look for 
ever-higher yields when the returns 
on orthodox financial instruments, like 
U.S. Treasuries, municipal bonds or 
bank CDs, become ho-hum.
On a possible regulatory 
response. My guess is that a great 
deal of the potential dislocation result-
ing from corrective reactions to the 
subprime boom will be resolved by 
regulatory initiatives rather than by 
monetary policy. Yet it is important to 
remember that regulatory reforms are 
like a vaccine—better at preventing 
sickness than at curing it. Much of the 
solution for the current pathology lies 
in the curative workings of the finan-
cial markets. I suspect the markets will 
be unsparing in their treatment of the 
most egregious of those who engaged 
in risky financial behavior. There is 
little that regulation can or should do 
to interfere with letting that treatment 
run its course.
Any new regulations that might 
now be crafted to prevent future recur-
rences must be well thought out, for 
two reasons. First, financial institu-
tions will quickly adapt to defeat any 
regulation that is poorly designed, 
morphing into new, vaccine-resistant 
strains. Second, heavy-handed regula-
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tions are sometimes worse than the 
disease against which they are meant 
to protect. I would be wary of any 
regulatory initiatives that interfere with 
market discipline and attempts to pro-
tect risk takers from the consequences 
of bad decisions for fear of creating 
a moral hazard that might endanger 
the long-term health of our economic 
and financial system simply to provide 
momentary relief.  
On the danger of inflation. Our 
job is not to bail out imprudent deci-
sionmakers or errant bankers, nor is it 
to directly support the stock market or 
to somehow make whole those money 
managers, financial engineers and real 
estate speculators who got it wrong. 
And it most definitely is not to err on 
the side of Wall Street at the expense 
of Main Street. 
In fact, to benefit Main Street, we 
have a duty to maintain a financial sys-
tem that enables American capitalism 
to do its magic. 
In setting broader monetary policy 
and the fed funds target rate, the Fed 
operates under a dual mandate. We 
are charged by Congress with creating 
the monetary conditions for sustain-
able, noninflationary employment 
growth. Put more simply, our mandate 
is to grow employment and to contain 
inflation. Unstable prices are incompat-
ible with sustainable job growth. Some 
critics worry that we have forgotten 
that axiom. We haven’t.
In discharging our dual mandate, 
we must be mindful that short-term 
fixes often lead to long-term problems. 
The Fed occupies a unique place in 
the pantheon of government institu-
tions. It was deliberately designed to 
be calm and steady, untainted by the 
passion of the moment and immune 
to political exigency and influence. 
Because monetary policy’s effects 
spread into the economy slowly and 
accumulate over time, having an itchy 
trigger finger with monetary policy 
risks shooting everyone in the foot. 
Our policy mandate is discharged with 
careful and deliberate aim.
Fisher is president and chief executive 
officer at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas. 
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Excerpts have been culled with minor editing 
from the following speeches:
“The U.S., Mexican and Border Economies,” 
remarks before a Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
Community Luncheon, Laredo, Texas, Sept. 10, 
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“You Earn What You Learn,” delivered to the 
North Dallas Chamber of Commerce Seventh 
Annual Real Estate Symposium, Dallas, Sept. 24, 
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“Challenges for Monetary Policy in a Globalized 
Economy,” remarks before the Global 
Interdependence Center, Philadelphia, Jan. 17, 
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“The Egocentricity of the Present (Prefaced by 
the Tale of Ruth and Emma),” remarks before 
a Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Community 
Forum, San Antonio, April 9, 2008.
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to Chicago),” remarks before the Chicago Council 
on Global Affairs, Chicago, April 17, 2008.
The full speeches can be found at
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